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■ *Suggestion, treated at most as a fringe phenomenon in mainstream social psychology, is conceived below as a core phenomenon in a wide range of social influence processes (i.e., between persons), especially those which use the paralinguistic and nonverbal channel. However, not every social influence amounts to suggestion, and not every and all suggestion is social influence. Accordingly, conceptual classifications are introduced below distinguishing between (1) social and nonsocial modes of influence by drawing upon a sender-receiver (or source-target) model; (2) intentional vs. unintentional influence processes; and (3) cognition and affect in a phenomenal perspective designated as "extended subjective behaviorism" differentiating between the organism's or person's perceiving, cognizing, or "testing" two different aspects of its (or her or his) phenomenal world: A world of probability and a world of meaning. Suggestion is that mode of influence that engages the meaning world test of the receiver. Because the world of social phenomena (as against the world of things) is especially constituted as a meaning world, it often needs disambiguation of meaning, making social cognition and resting social behavior prone to suggestion.*

In addressing the audience of this book, the author need not argue at great length that suggestion has in scientific discourse the status of a concept referring to a circumscribed set of phenomena that are worthy of scientific investigation. Nor does it need defense as a fringe or companion aspect of other phenomena. It is a core phenomenon in its own right. Mainstream social psychologists view the situation as different. The author, being himself a social psychologist, would have a hard time in trying to convince his fellow social psychologists (who are active in all sorts of paradigms and subparadigms of the field) that suggestion is a genuine subject of social psychology. Textbooks and journals in social psychology witness the respective lacunae. From an historically informed perspective this is surprising since in the beginnings of psychology, in

the second half of the last century and up to the early years of the present one, suggestion was a core concept when psychologists struggled to conceptualize and explain social (i.e., group, or collective) behavior. Early scientific endeavour drew heavily on the notion of suggestion (see Allport, 1985; Moscovici, 1985) to amend Rousseau's rational "contrat social" by pointing at nonrational underpinnings of social (especially crowd) behavior. This was merely speculative, however, and when social psychology turned empirical, a fortiori experimental, speculation assumed less of an emphasis and suggestion along with it.

Colleagues from medical, clinical, forensic, and even general psychology contributing to this volume and reporting on their research are calling to attention that social psychology might have done away with the child (the phenomenon of suggestion) along with the bathwater (speculation) out of the tub (social psychological research). To have another look at that child might be timely even for the experimentally-based field of social psychology since its recent paradigm of social cognition (or information processing) is by itself progressively crossing the boundaries from rational to "non-rational" phenomena (with its focus on heuristic biases; effects of emotion on cognition and effects of cognition on emotion). In fact, and as mentioned above, the special phenomenal feature that was intriguing for those early social psychologists about suggestion was that the concept referred to the apparently nonrational, irrational or even abnormal side of human behavior. This notion was meant to typify what was special in the physician-patient relationship in the treatment by hypnosis, and by extrapolation, between the members of a crowd. Lay people would add that sales (and political) advertising more often than not tries to appeal to customers or voters by nonrational means. (Intriguingly, the author was recently asked to contribute an entry "Suggestion" to a Handbook of Applied Psychology; Schwabnberger, 1993.)

If we as social psychologists accept the conviction of our professional colleagues in other fields and of laypeople alike, that there does exist something called suggestion, and if we are going to profit from that interest to look deeper into the matter, one might well ask what could social psychology in turn contribute from its vantage-point to a more fo-cused investigation? Hard data, of course, if it turns to them, and in the present chapter, conceptualization. Such a conceptualization draws upon the general framework of social psychology, especially that core part of it which delineates the processes of social influence. More specifically, it should be informed by Heider's (1958) social phenomenological psychology of interpersonal relations; by McGuire's (1968; 1972; 1985) "systems" theorizing regarding attitude change through social influence by communication; and, thirdly, perhaps, by the author's own model of an "extended subjective behaviorism" (Schwabnberger, 1990a; 1990b; 1999), which extends on the "subjective behaviorism" of the TOTE model by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960).

These three threads have been conceptually interwoven in the author's contribution to the First International Symposium on Suggestion and Suggestibility (Schwanenberger, 1989). In that contribution, particular attention is paid to the task of discriminating con-

ceptually between suggestion and persuasion, persuasion being the head notion for social influence through communication in the research completed by social psychologists generally on attitude change. What the present contribution does is (1) to reflect (confirmingly) on Gheorghiu and Kruse's (1991) conception of suggestion as functioning as a quasi-reflex, providing disambiguation in an ambiguous stimulus world; (2) to recapitulate the "extended subjective behaviorism model", and (3) to offer a sender-receiver scheme for types of social influence and social perception that attempts to isolate suggestion as a special type of relationship occurring between sender and receiver, or source and target.

Suggestion as a Cueing Reflex

Gheorghiu and Kruse (1991) stated that the stimulus world surrounding humans is ambiguous and that perception operates in a way that uses subtle cues from the environment so to reorganize itself to form more definite a picture from the surroundings in order that the organism may act more speedily upon its world. This is an intriguing notion for a social psychologist. Gheorghiu and Kruse make the point that suggestion functions in supplying such cues, resulting in perceptual, cognitive, and, at the end, behavioral shortcuts. I note that suggestion, according to them, makes its inroads (into cognition, motivation, and behavior) at the perceptual level. That is, the world as it is phenomenally given takes up a certain shape, following effective suggestion. Such a notion relates to Heider's (1958, p. 245) conception that it "is possible that (a person) p changes a proper valence for (another person) o" (parentheses added by author). Valences are Lewinian terms with a noticeable Gestalt ancestry, translating into (originally German) "Aufforderungscharaktere" as they present themselves in a phenomenally given situation or "life space". McGuire (1972, p. 115) points to the same level of psychological functioning when he describes how perceptual theory approaches attitude change: "The basic concept underlying the perceptual approaches to attitude change is that adjustment involves not only the person changing himself to conform to the demands of the environment, but also changing his perception of environmental demands to conform to his own needs." However, whereas McGuire's statement may also refer to perception as the final result of attitude change (which may itself derive also from persuasion by the sender and rational deliberation by the receiver) Gheorghiu and Kruse focus (for explaining the workings of suggestion) on the point of information influx: the point or level in the sequence of information processing where the organism first meets the stimulus ambiguity of the world surrounding it.

Any social psychologist is apt to think of the social stimulus world as especially ambiguous. For a human perceiver (or receiver!) another human being is more ambiguous than, say, a table or a broom. For a social psychological theorist, this is clearly derivative from Heider's (1958) principle of equifinality: human behavior is directed toward aims, and the same aim can be attained by many ways and means. One among them is disguise or plain lying; but even without such discrepancy between the true and

Extended Subjective Behaviorism Model

The "extended subjective behaviorism model" (Figure 1) extends Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's model by adding another "test" to it (Schwaneberg, 1990a; 1990b). This test is a test for (organismic to psychosocial) meaning, whereas the original model is confined to a test applicable to a robot when hammering a nail (see Miller, Galanter, & Pribram's example for their conception of behavior). Their test, in the present author's words, is assessing the World of Probability, or Probability World (PW, for short): the random to determinate structures in space and time in the physical but also in the social world. The test for the World of Meaning, or Meaning World (MW, for short) tests for the meaning that those structures have (or do not have) for the well-being or ill-being of the organism (or person). The distinction between the two tests relates to the traditional distinction between cognition and affect. The PW-test equals the traditional notion of ("cold") cognition whereas the MW-test is the "feeling test" (contained in "hot" cognition). In terms of the extended model, both "tests" amount to cognitions, but of different kinds. Note that the PW-tests have an objective reference in the world of events (encompassing both worlds that are tested for) whereas the MW-tests have just a subjective one: What is good for one person might not be good (and feel different) for another one, and vice versa. When Wundt pointed out the subjective nature of feelings, he pointed out the nature of MW-tests. Since proverbially one cannot be sure of one's feelings, social norms are installed to disambiguate the world of meaning. However, not every aspect of the meaning (or feeling) world is made up into and covered by social (or even personal) norms; and sociologists know that norms also dissolve and get lost. In other words, there is enough disambiguity left in the meaning world. Since a clear and definite perceptual (and cognitive) structure is achieved less easily in the world of meaning than in the world of spatial and temporal relationships, situational context or "ground" cues should be even more important as feeding into perceptual-cognitive self-organization. And since the social environment is particularly screened (or tested) for its evaluative meaning (a proposition which can also be deduced from Heider's equifinality principle), suggestion should indeed be found operative especially in the realm of social psychology.

Sender-receiver Model

The sender-receiver model (familiar from communication studies) is also implicit in Heider's (1958) social phenomenological analysis when he discusses the "interpersonal relationship" between one person (p) and another one (o). Since Heider's social phenomenology is helpful in charting out phenomenal ground, not yet charted by mainstream empirical research (though it was seminal in inaugurating balance, attribution, and responsibility research), we must begin with a tribute to him.

Heider (1958, pp. 245-246; see also Schwaneberg, 1989) classifies five different ways in which humans exert influence upon one another. Conspicuously, the first one in his list is suggestion. The following quote is central to my argument: "It is possible




Figure 1: Extended Subjective Behaviorism Model

the false meaning behind a sender's behavior, true meaning itself may be hard to discern, even for the sender. Many behaviors do not carry their meaning openly in such a salient way that their meaning can be perceived unerringly. This refers both to goal-oriented behavior (actions or acts) and to expressive nonverbal (and, of course, verbal) behavior. Jones and Davis (1965) have made the case for the "acts" (tracing the cognitive inferences "from acts to dispositions"); they also pointed out that "hedonistic relevance" will bias (i.e., shortcut) the cognitive inference processes.

If this is the state of affairs in the perceptual social world, the human social perceptual system, in line with Gheorghiu and Kruse, will be set up to disambiguate it, even more so than the physical world (of "thing perception"). The more economical, i.e., the faster this process operates, the better it is (in terms of a functional average). Therefore, disambiguation at the perceptual level (as against the level of cognitive inferences) should be well established. In elaborating upon Gheorghiu and Kruse, one might presume that the social perceptual system draws upon context cues to disambiguate the stimulus situation. In Gestalt terms, context cues belong to the "ground" of the "figure". Since part of the lay (or social phenomenological) conceptual meaning of suggestion is that it goes unnoticed by the receiver, one may think of suggestion as working via "ground" cues. This point is taken up again in the influence typology later in this chapter.




Figure 2: The Sender-receiver Model

that p changes a proper valence for o. Something that was unattractive to o suddenly seems attractive because of p's action; o wants to do it, and he is induced to think that x is good for him. It is possible for p to produce this change in the proper valence for o if he can manipulate the different conditions for the establishment of a positive valence by praising x, by persuading o that x is good, or by demonstratively enjoying x. In the mind of o, p only shows what is good; he is not the source of the valence but only the cause of o's realizing the valence. The real source of the valence is in the properties of x; it is intrinsically good, and p helped o to become aware of it."

The second mode of social influence is persuasion: "p shows o the consequences of x" (i.e., the contingencies in the World of Probability). No. 3 is equivalent to outcome




Figure 3: Further implications of Sender-receiver Model




Figure 4: Persuasion and Suggestion Model

control as delineated by Thibaut & Kelley (1969): "p can ... create consequences for o by promising reward or punishment". No. 4 is request: "A request refers to a positive sentiment, and is based on the fact that o tends to benefit a p whom he likes". Finally, No. 5 is command: "In this case the force in o toward doing x is created through the power relation between p and o".

The following classificatory scheme focuses on persuasion (the classical lab mode in studying attitude change through social influence by communication) and suggestion. Heider's above classification indicates that not all and every social influence is suggestion. Now we must add that not all suggestion is social influence. For social influence to be effected, there must be a social source (sender) plus a social target (receiver). Figure 2 depicts the most general overview regarding what "influences" what. Social influence is addressed in the last one (from the top down) of the four combinations. The first one is plainly Newtonian (referring to pure WP events); the other two (in-between) can only anthropomorphically be spoken of as social, for example, when the moon is said to suggest (create a feeling of) a romance to (or in) a person.

Figure 3 differentiates the communicative relationship between social source and social target, or sender and receiver, by introducing the two kinds of tests (PW and MW) and, in addition, the intentionality or deliberateness versus the unintentionality or undeliberateness of sending and/or receiving. This latter aspect draws its theoretical origins from Heider. Since not every one of the 16 sender-receiver combinations is of equal empirical, professional, and historical import, Fig. 4 singles out for final discussion those four which are most relevant for having a closer social psychological look of what is distinctive about suggestion in the realm of social phenomena.

The first one (again from the top down) of the four sender-receiver constellations is the classical one of persuasion research: A sender is intent on convincing a receiver by using arguments that delineate contingencies (or dependencies) between events that can be expected when the receiver behaves in such and such a way. However, it is to be noted that persuasion researchers when using fear appeals (Janis, 1967; Leventhal,

1970) have also addressed the receiver's feeling, or meaning, test. In everyday life, communications trying to communicatively influence another person presumably address both PW- and MW-tests, in varying degrees and/or proportions, depending on the sender, the receiver, and the situation. If the PW-test by the receiver is the more decisive one, it is fitting to speak of persuasion; if the MW-test dominates, we should speak of suggestion. Moscovici (1985), in pointing out that the influence of a minority upon a majority depends on the "behavioral style" of the minority, in fact points at the importance of the meaning test in the workings of that influence; he even stresses the importance of the "meaning" of (minority) behavior when that behavior effectively operates on the attitudes of the (receiving) majority. What he means by "meaning", however, is not clear, or articulated. He probably draws upon a common sense understanding of the term. The present model says that "meaning" is that which relates to a receiver's well- or ill-being in his or her or their lives; since this state is often difficult to specify, meaning is so, too.

The same observation as by Moscovici is made by McGuire (1985) when he discusses the importance of "message style" for the impact of a communication. The message style often depends on a particular source. When Scherer (Scherer et al., 1973) studied and emphasized the "voice of confidence", he emphasized that aspect of communication. In general, when studying so-called "source effects", one should be aware of suggestion effects. The nonverbal channel is particularly effective in transporting them. At the same time, the nonverbal channel is (on the average) to a lesser degree deliberately controlled relative to the verbal one when the receiver tests the content of a communication. Similarly, the sender, too, is not always intentionally aware of what he is communicating nonverbally to a receiver.

This leads us to focus upon the intentionality/unintentionality aspect of the classification and to the highlight final source-target constellations. Consider the case (from above) when a sender deliberately, that is, acting on a plan (in the Miller, Galanter, and Pribram sense) that instrumentalizes the probability structures of human information processing and behavior, targets (and operates upon) the MW-tests of the receiver which operation the receiver himself (or herself) does not consciously register as such. This is the case depicted in the Heider quotation where "p changes a proper valence for o" and o is unaware of p's intent of doing so. For o, the receiver, the change in the valence, i.e., the change of the meaning test or feeling regarding x, appears to be intrinsic to x and not induced by p, the sender. Festinger's (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) in setting up his forced-compliance paradigm has used this mechanism in the laboratory to pragmatically produce behavior in his subjects that is discrepant from their attitudes (i.e., meaning tests or true feelings). Festinger did not make use of refined and elaborate written messages containing logical arguments; he simply appealed to the subject's identity: "I need YOU!" From this, one may conclude that communications addressing the self and, in particular, how he or she feels about him- or herself, are an experimenter's - as well as a lay person's - royal road to make another person comply

without objecting. There is no response to it because the receiver's self is the figure and the sender is its ground, unnoticed by the receiver as the stimulus cause of his (or her) behavior. This is, of course, the human event of which an onlooker, as a third party, is most fascinated: When a receiver does something which he/she is manipulated into without being aware of it.

The third constellation concerns the case of a sender where the probability test is completely dominated or over-ruled by the meaning test and where, in addition, the sender has lost control of what he or she is communicating to the receiver. This is known as acting in affect. The receiver would be a scientist (like Lewin) or a diagnostician who applies a PW-test to the sender's behavior. That PW-test would be based on a theory (in the mind of the receiver) of the dynamic forces engendered by the sender's own MW-testing and how they "affect" his/her behavior - scientific theories, including psychological, theories, be they social psychological or differential psycho-logical, indeed do test for event expectancies, or probabilities.

The last constellation depicts the one that the speculative founding fathers of social psychology were most fascinated with (although they had negative feelings about it): Suggestion as emotional contagion in the crowd. Here, again, the nonverbal channel is decisive in producing it. In those historical days of speculation, suggestion was linked to behavioral "imitation"; but this sender-receiver constellation relates not only to the anonymity within a crowd but also to the intimacy within the dyad. This characterizes suggestion by "close feeling" and mutual emotional resonance. Although such a constellation appears to typify suggestion at its height - suggestion in mutual or reciprocal operation and reverberation - it also appears to be ecologically the most difficult of all to study in the lab.

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Lie Detection As an Attribution Process: The Anchoring Effect Revisited

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■ In this chapter, lie detection is conceptualized as a universal meta-communicative attribution task. Communications can be attributed either to the topic (e.g., advertising reflecting a genuine product advantage) or to the speaker (e.g., the advertising company's interests). While topic attribution implies high veracity, speaker attribution raises suspicion. The likelihood of eliciting this basic attribution module increases with factors such as linguistic anomalies, emotional arousal, or personal importance. New experimental methods and empirical results are reported that illustrate the basic theory assumptions, showing that veracity judgments can be influenced by cues which direct attention at the topic (veracity) or at the speaker (suspicion). In particular, the present approach raises an alternative account of the so-called anchoring effect in lie detection, that is, the higher suspicion when the communication task is to comprehend (topic focus) rather than to judge the truth (speaker focus). Using the computer mouse for online assessment of suspicion reactions, this phenomenon is shown to reflect the gradual development of topic versus speaker attributions, rather than an insufficient adjustment of an initial extreme anchor.

The aim of the present chapter is to delineate and illustrate an attributional theory of lie detection and credibility judgment, with particular reference to the so-called anchoring effect in lie detection.

All communication in everyday settings involves the meta-cognitive task of truth-monitoring. This requires communication participants to judge all the time - often under extreme uncertainty - whether an utterance reflects a true property of the topic of communication or some other motive or interest in the speaker. In attributional terms, truth-monitoring revolves around the conflict of topic attribution versus speaker attribution. Within this attributional framework, the role of several heuristic cues in mediating lie detection and credibility judgments will be emphasized. The proposed